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Taking Rhetoric Seriously:  





Wherever there is a discussion of style in literary works, one begins by asserting what seems 
rather obvious: that there is a deep connection between content and form, between what is 
thought and how it is expressed. In this case, ‘style’ is understood as the totality of techniques 
used to convey ideas in a meaningful manner, and so it remains at a distance from thought 
itself—it is primarily a mode of aesthetic expression and not a way of thinking. At first sight, 
the same thing could be said to hold when it comes to discussions of philosophical writings: 
the distinction between content and form is present here as well, but, in addition, ‘style’ appears 
to be considered only supplementary to the ideas expressed. For it is philosophy which, in 
trying to define itself in opposition to literature, claims to be the rational search for truth, 
though its name is only ‘love of wisdom’. But it appears that philosophy is, in any case, a 
strange kind of love, one that hides its origin (for after all, it is a human yearning for truth, 
meaning, wisdom) and so tends to efface the presence of the ‘lovers’. Or perhaps one could 
suspect at this point that philosophers themselves are the ones who, in their loving of wisdom, 
usually employ a writing style that is aimed at concealing their presence as authors, such that 




all, something philosophy has always treasured—especially during modernity, when the 
possibility of transforming this discipline into a rigorous science was for the first time taken 
into account.  Seen in this light, philosophy should usually be written in a clear, precise and 
orderly manner, and, since it is a rational search for truth, it would demand that the authors 
begin their inquiries by first presenting a method that would offer us guidance with regards to 
how authentic knowledge will be secured. It would appear, then, that ‘philosophy’ and 
‘literature’ are, so to speak, opposed types of writing, but many twentieth-century thinkers, 
such as Heidegger, Derrida and others, tried to demonstrate this is not the case by collapsing 
the boundaries between the two—and Nietzsche, who was a major influence for basically all 
of twentieth-century continental philosophy, had a similar project. 
It should not seem surprising, then, that Friedrich Nietzsche’s texts are often very 
difficult—if not impossible—to include in a clearly defined category (philosophy? literature?), 
without our being forced to change the way we think about the meaning of ‘philosophy’ and 
‘literature’. In fact, it is not even advisable that one read and interpret a thinker like Nietzsche 
by starting from very abstract notions or rigidly defined concepts. Because it is by attending 
seriously to his text that one begins the difficult task of interpretation, especially in the case of 
a thinker whose books appear to stand at the border between philosophy and literature, and 
whose use of language does not ignore or deny but rather emphasise its rhetorical nature. Now, 
of course, Nietzsche is not the only one who intentionally departs from the conventional style 
of philosophy (one can think here of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Derrida, and many others); what 
makes each of these writers interesting and unique, however, has to be sought in their 
philosophical projects. In the case of Nietzsche, whose writing will be the subject of this essay, 
it is well known that the unconventional style he employs abounds in aphorisms, metaphors, 
hyperboles, ironical remarks, sarcasm, contradictions; but when one goes on to claim—after a 




fragmentary’, one focuses on what constitutes only a small part of his works, and disregards, 
for example, texts like The Birth of Tragedy or On the Genealogy of Morals. By approaching 
his text more carefully, however, one should arrive instead at the conclusion that what makes 
Nietzsche so easy to misunderstand is that he in fact does not use only one style, but many.  
What is the reason for this? Why does Nietzsche rely on a multitude of different styles, 
and does this eradicate the possibility of finding a unitary meaning in his writings? What does 
he want to achieve? In this discussion, I will argue (drawing on the more recent works of David 
Owen and Christopher Janaway) that Nietzsche’s preference for various styles and rhetorical 
devices is strongly connected with his philosophical commitments and therefore justified as 
the proper means of transmitting his teachings on morality. In the first section, I will point out 
some difficulties with Nietzsche’s writing, and will present the ways in which different scholars 
have attempted to make sense of it; I will also comment on some of the interpretations of 
Nietzsche which I take to constitute the more extreme tendencies, and will explain why these 
should be avoided. Sections II, III and IV will contain my arguments for holding the view that 
Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric is not merely a matter of style, but that it is instead a necessity 
imposed on his writing by the manner in which he construed the central problem that he wanted 
to address, that of nihilism and how to overcome it. I will draw attention in section II to the 
fact that Nietzsche does not write in a rigorous and straightforward way, because he does not 
think that by simply unfolding a series of rational arguments, he will be able to solve problems 
like that of moving ‘beyond good and evil’ (overcoming morality); what is rather needed is 
forming an affective relation with those who are willing to understand what he has to say. Then, 
section III will demonstrate that Nietzsche uses rhetoric in order to make his readers suspect 
the origin of morality and its value, and, in this way, to render possible a critique of moral 
values—this would be, so to speak, the negative use of his rhetoric. In the final section, I will 




overcome nihilism, which is one of the main concerns of Nietzsche – thus I will show the 
positive use of his rhetoric. Taking into account, then, what I consider to be three fundamental 
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, i.e. the importance of psychology; the critique of morality; 
and the need to overcome nihilism, and showing how these are reflected in his writing style, I 
will demonstrate that making use of rhetoric, far from being incidental in Nietzsche’s case, 
proves to be very effective in expressing his ideas and way of thinking. 
 
I. Styles 
Let us return to the question of Nietzsche’s styles, and let us consider in more detail what this 
would imply with regards to interpreting Nietzsche’s text. Sarah Kofman, for example, in her 
book Nietzsche and Metaphor, recognises that ‘just as he multiplies perspectives, so Nietzsche 
intentionally diversifies his styles in order to save the reader from misunderstanding a single 
style as a “style in itself”’’.1 In fact, this is admitted by Nietzsche himself, when he writes that: 
 
To communicate a state, an inward tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo 
of these signs-that is the meaning of every style; and considering that the multiplicity of inward 
states is exceptionally large in my case, I have many stylistic possibilities—the most 
multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man. Good is any style that 
really communicates an inward state, that makes no mistake about the signs, the tempo of the 
signs, the gestures […].2 
 
What this passage from Ecce Homo suggests is that there is no unique style which must 
be held paramount in writing, and so even in the case of philosophy, if one has come to realise 
 
1 Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor (London: Athlone Press, 1993), p. 2. Further references to this edition 
are given after quotations in the text. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale and W. 




that it has an essentially written character and cannot do without words, then there would be 
no problem in changing styles as often as one desires. However, Kofman thinks that the task 
of the ‘philosophy of the future’ would be to dissolve all oppositions between concept (taken 
to be representative of the old, traditional style of writing philosophy) and metaphor (which is 
one of the styles employed by Nietzsche himself, and which is usually associated with poetry) 
(Kofman, pp. 17–8). She says:  
 
Tyranny is reprehensible in all its forms, including that of any philosopher seeking to raise his 
spontaneous evaluation to the status of absolute value and his style to that of a philosophical 
style ‘in itself’, opposed to the poetic style ‘in itself’ like truth opposed to untruth, good to evil. 
But the tyranny of anyone seeking simply to invert the terms and commend the value of 
metaphor alone is equally reprehensible: he remains ensnared in the same system of thought as 
the metaphysician. 
(Kofman, p. 3) 
 
Thus, for Kofman, the decision to use a variety of styles would be in strong relationship 
with the rejection of metaphysical oppositions and dogmatism, which is characteristic of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. As is well known, the fundamental notion of ‘perspectivism’—the idea 
that the way one perceives things is not the truth, but rather a perspective (which even at this 
point, implies a certain degree of interpretation and evaluation) that is good for him/her, 
although not necessarily good for everyone—is crucial here, because if a change in style 
represents, ultimately, a change in perspective, then the distinction between content and form 
becomes blurred. By employing various styles, then, Nietzsche’s intention is to remind us of 
his presence as author, and this is in some sense constraining but also liberating. Because, even 
if Nietzsche wants all who read his books to see, to become aware, that his interpretations are 




interested in his ideas and want to understand what he has to say about morality, the value of 
truth, and the like, find themselves compelled to accept Nietzsche’s text as it appears, as it is 
written—they are, paradoxically, not in a position to ‘interpret’ it. But at the same time, 
Nietzsche’s refusal to pretend that he is not involved in the construction of his texts is 
liberating, since those who read him (well) cannot be brought to the conclusion that with 
Nietzsche’s writings, interpretation has come to an end.  
Alexander Nehamas has basically made a similar point in Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 
wherein he claims that Nietzsche’s recourse to a multitude of styles cannot be, in any way taken 
as meaning that Nietzsche was somehow an anti-philosopher, that he opposed philosophy ‘as 
such’. It is dogmatic philosophy which tends to denounce other modes of thinking as ‘non-
philosophy’, and so Nietzsche’s ‘new kind’ of philosophy can only be distinguished if it is 
considered in relation to the tradition that philosophers have inherited from Socrates and Plato. 
As Nehamas explains: ‘Nietzsche is so suspicious of Plato and Socrates because he believes 
that their approach is essentially dogmatic. He attributes to them the view that their view is not 
simply a view but an accurate description of the real world which forces its own acceptance 
and makes an unconditional claim on everyone’s assent.’3 In other words, it is the case that 
philosophy (in this dogmatic sense) hides its origin (which is in individual evaluations and 
interpretations) so that it may appear to proclaim universal truths which would not need further 
questioning. Nehamas also observes this and goes further to say that: 
 
It is in the interest of dogmatic approaches to hide their specific origins; in this way they are 
enabled to make universal claims. This it one of the reasons […] why Nietzsche engages in the 
practice he calls ‘genealogy’, for genealogy reveals the very particular very interested origins 
from which actually emerge the views that we have forgotten are views and take instead as 
 
3 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 




facts. Genealogy reveals both these origins and the mechanisms by which the views in question 
try to conceal them. 
(Nehamas, pp. 32–3) 
 
It can be seen here that the purpose of genealogy is to show, as Nietzsche famously said 
at one point in The Will to Power, that ‘facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations’, 
which is not to say that everything is relative, but rather to affirm perspectivism once again, 
meaning that what comes to be known as a fact is not separated from interpretation: thus there 
are no bare facts, but no ‘mere’ interpretations either.4 Now, when hearing the word 
‘interpretation’, one usually tries to grasp its meaning by thinking of it in opposition to ‘truth’, 
and in this case interpretation could justifiably be considered ‘mere’ interpretation. But 
Nietzsche’s point is not that there is no truth in the way we interpret the world, ourselves, and 
so on, but rather that this truth is not binding for all. This is perhaps clearly illustrated in the 
Second Essay from On the Genealogy of Morals, when Nietzsche talks about the origin of bad 
conscience in the moralisation of suffering and says that ‘The aspect of suffering which actually 
causes outrage is not suffering itself, but the meaninglessness of suffering.’5 It is by trying to 
find a meaning behind this suffering, i.e. to come up with an interpretation of it, that man has 
worsened his condition and has not reduced but increased his suffering. Arthur Danto has made 
a very interesting point in this regard, for he claims that Nietzsche’s project in the Genealogy 
is to help those who read it cure themselves of ressentiment, which is another sign of the will 
for suffering to have a meaning: 
  
 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale and W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1967), p. 267. 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. by Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 




What Nietzsche objects to is not so much this model [of justice based on punishment] but its 
total generalisation, making every suffering a punition and the entire world a court of justice 
with a penitentiary annex. If I am right that this is his view, the final aphorism of the Genealogy, 
‘man would rather will the nothing than not will,’ does not so much heroise mankind, after all. 
What it does is restate the instinct of ressentiment: man would rather his suffering be 
meaningful, hence would rather will meaning onto it, that acquiesce in the meaninglessness of 
it. […] In a way, the deep affliction from which he seeks to relieve us is what today we think 
of as hermeneutics: the method of interpretation primarily of suffering. And when he says […] 
‘there are no facts, only interpretation,’ he is, I believe, finally addressing the deep, perhaps 
ineradicable propensities of ressentiment.6 
 
This last point is indeed based on a subtle reading of Nietzsche, not least because it 
presents his view of perspectivism as opposed to hermeneutics and in a way connected to the 
deconstructive approach devised by Jacques Derrida, who is certainly one of Nietzsche’s 
inheritors. Understood, then, in the way Danto has, the famous aphorism shows that there is a 
deep connection between Nietzsche’s conception of the problem posed by moralizing 
suffering, and his way of recognizing and unmasking the various things that are similar to it 
and lead to ressentiment (in this case, for example, the idea that there is always only one true 
interpretation). 
One could at least begin to discern some features of Nietzsche’s styles from what was 
said so far. Let me now go back one moment to Nehamas’s text and say that the way in which 
he thinks Nietzsche solves the problem concerning the dogmatism of philosophers is by 
distinguishing himself from Socrates and criticizing that tradition: and he does so not by 
ceasing to write works that could be considered philosophical, but rather by changing the way 
 
6 Arthur Danto, ‘Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals’, in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. by 




in which philosophy was written, by employing a variety of styles, by presenting a multitude 
of perspectives. Nietzsche in fact said, in his early Lectures on Rhetoric, that: 
 
There is obviously no unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of language to which one could appeal; 
language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make 
operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power that Aristotle 
calls rhetoric, is at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as 
rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things.7 
 
So, he has easily noticed that words are not identical with the things they stand for as 
signs, and because of this all truth amounts to a convention at the level of language. On the 
origin of truth, Nietzsche says in a well-known passage that it has become hidden the moment 
our metaphorical constructions (pertaining to rhetoric and so essential to language) have lost 
their force (and this applies also to the creation of concepts in general, for they are a form of 
falsification):  
 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which 
have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.8 
 
 
7 Sander Gilman, Carole Blair and David Parent, Friedrich Nietzsche on Language and Rhetoric (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21. 
8 Daniel Breazeale, ed., Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of Early 1870’s (New 




 Nietzsche therefore does not attempt to escape these aspects of language, when he 
writes philosophy, and neither does he want to pretend for his readers that he does so, but rather 
criticises the dogmatic (and metaphysical) tradition by revealing its origins and motivation (for 
example, by showing why and how have people come to value truth above all else). One could 
hardly fail to notice, at this point, that rhetoric for Nietzsche occupies a position similar to that 
which writing has for Derrida, who, noticing—for example, in Plato’s Phaedrus and many 
other texts—that if truth is not present in writing as it is in speech, then it is not immediately 
present in speech either, proposed a ‘science of writing’ as a ‘remedy’, concluding that 
philosophy should be more written, and employing in his own works a significant amount of 
devices meant to destabilise the privileged position occupied by speech in the Western 
tradition. Similarly, as I already said, Nietzsche 
 
does not hope […] to make possible a nonrhetorical philosophy by revealing some hitherto 
unnoticed error. […] Philosophy is inseparable from language, and no self-consciousness will 
alter or transcend that circumstance. For Nietzsche, the goal is not to discover the unvarnished 
truth, for there is no such thing. Rather, the aim is to understand the forces – such as the need 
to communicate and the will to power – that have produced those ideas about truth which have 
driven philosophy through its long history.9 
 
Now, in closing this section I want to draw attention to what I consider to be two 
extreme tendencies of interpreting Nietzsche, which are in my opinion wrong, because they 
both fail to take seriously into consideration the connection between content and style. In fact, 
I take these misunderstandings to spring from a questionable way of looking at Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Thus, one way of interpreting Nietzsche’s style is to say that it is merely a 
supplement to the ideas expressed, and that the abundance of metaphors, rhetorical 
 




interrogations, and aphorisms are not helping to identify his claims and arguments (if there are 
any), but rather unnecessarily obscure them. Those who fall in the other extreme actually do 
not fail to take into account the importance of Nietzsche’s rhetoric, however, they only seem 
to be concerned with and to put emphasis on his literary style and in doing so are misled to 
think that Nietzsche’s writings are merely a way to make apparent if not the impossibility, then 
at least the undecidability of meaning, as if he did not really intend to say anything, but 
nevertheless used rhetoric as a means to avoid making definitive claims. One thing that is not 
accidental in Nietzsche’s texts is, however, the insistence that his philosophy is not meant to 
be understood by everybody, and that as a result of this, his style would not please all readers. 
I believe that those who read Nietzsche in any of the two ways mentioned above are judging 
wrongly that the various styles he employs do not, in fact, find their justification in Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism: they either desire to discover universal truths, or want to impose their own 
interpretation by not paying attention to the form specific to different texts. But, to emphasise 
once again, ‘Nietzsche uses his changing genres and styles in order to make his presence as an 
author literally unforgettable and in order to prevent his readers from overlooking the fact that 
his views necessarily originate with him. He depends on many styles in order to suggest that 
there is no single, neutral language in which his views, or any others, can ever be presented’ 
(Nehamas, p. 37). 
 
II. Psychology 
Perhaps one of the most important teachings of Nietzsche’s is that of not taking for granted the 
deep-seated presuppositions about morality, selfhood, knowledge, history and philosophy 
which are usually thought to be just self-evident. The great discovery, in his case, is of course 
the essential role that psychology occupies in explaining how humans came to judge what is 




become intertwined with our understanding of our psychic life, and this is very well shown in 
his critique of the ‘English psychologists’ throughout the Genealogy of Morals, who seem to 
be unable to infer correctly with regards to the origin of our moral values, since they assume 
that what is now considered ‘good’ has always been relevant for explaining human desires, 
needs, fears and so on, and not vice-versa. Nietzsche warns against this when he says, in Beyond 
Good and Evil, that ‘All psychology has hitherto remained anchored to moral prejudices and 
timidities: it has not ventured into the depths.’10 It becomes clear that what has to be done to 
understand human drives and emotions is to separate morality from psychology, and this cannot 
be achieved otherwise than through a very special kind of writing, which would indeed, as 
Nietzsche said in the Preface to Genealogy, make one feel ‘at some time deeply wounded and 
on another occasion just as deeply delighted’ (Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, p. 10). He 
emphasised the same point (and I consider this to be true both for author and reader) when he 
claimed that  
 
A genuine physio-psychology has to struggle with unconscious resistances in the heart of the 
investigator, it has ‘the heart’ against it: even a theory of the mutual dependence of the ‘good’ 
and the ‘wicked’ impulses causes, as a more refined immorality, revulsion to a conscience still 
strong and hearty – and even more a theory of the derivation of all good impulses from wicked 
ones. 
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 53) 
 
For it is one of the ‘prejudices of philosophers’ to consider ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as having 
separate origins, and pertaining to a metaphysical realm, the result of which being the 
intermingling of morality with theology. And Nietzsche could not have addressed this harmful 
 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 




connection between the two in some other way than by employing rhetorical constructions 
meant to stimulate our affects. This relates again to his perspectivism, since by starting to feel 
differently, one is at the same time starting to adopt a different interpretation. Therefore, 
Nietzsche’s thought that ‘psychology shall again be recognised as the queen of the sciences’, 
since it ‘is now once again the road to the fundamental problems’ has to do with an abandoning 
of metaphysical perspectives and a returning to an interpretation of human life that is rooted in 
history, physiology and psychology—this is the reason why the vocabulary used in the 
Genealogy abounds in terms and metaphors alluding to human drives, impulses, and so on 
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 54). Since there is resistance (against interpretation 
itself), presenting his views in a straightforward way does not prove to be effective for 
Nietzsche’s goal: the style employed reflects instead clearly that he writes with psychological 
intent. Changing between aphoristic or metaphoric styles is itself an expression of and evidence 
for the multitude of emotions that lays hidden, and which constitutes the basis of how we come 
to judge in terms of morality. 
 
III. Critique of Morality 
It could be said that the fundamental problem which motivates Nietzsche’s writing of 
philosophy (in the way that he does) is that of nihilism—what we are confronted with when the 
highest values devalue themselves. One of the ways in which Nietzsche refers to this problem 
is by using the hyperbolic expression ‘God is dead’, which most notably appears in The Gay 
Science.11 Simply put, he does not allude here to God as a transcendent being (since in this case 
asserting such a thing would be contradictory to God’s deathless nature), but rather to what has 
become of God in human beings, in what is immanent: ‘By its very nature, God the 
 
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 181. 




metaphysical entity cannot die. What is dead, then, must not be God Himself, as it were, but 
rather something that can be born and die, namely the idea of God or the belief in God.’12 But 
Nietzsche intends to prove that loss of belief in the Christian God does not already imply an 
abandoning of Christian morality, since to hold an interpretation of the world as that proposed 
by Christianity is in strong connection with a specific way of life, one that in fact does not 
affirm it, but is rather turned against life and against human nature itself. And the passage 
named above is crucial, I would suggest, in understanding Nietzsche’s strategy regarding the 
style necessary for a critique of this inherited morality. It would be interesting to observe that 
‘The Madman’ parable can also be taken as a warning against how not to read Nietzsche, since 
it has at its centre a failure of communication, or a failed relationship between the one who 
announces the ‘death of God’ (the Madman; Nietzsche), and those who are not yet able to 
recognise this ‘tremendous event’ (the people from the marketplace; those who gave up belief 
in God but not in Christian morality, those who are not prepared for the ‘philosophy of the 
future’, those who value truth above all else, even when it proves to be harmful). 
A loss of the belief in God is an event that engages human existence totally, because it 
carries with it the danger of forgetting what it means to be human. As such, the ‘death of God’ 
and the consequences that ensue in its aftermath cannot be recognised for what they are if this 
event were to be presented in a direct manner, and Nietzsche is fully aware of this necessity. 
Therefore, it is crucial that he makes use of the figure of the Madman as the one who, ironically, 
seeks to enlighten others—‘Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!”’ 
(Nietzsche, Gay Science, p. 181). The various symbolic gestures that accompany the speech 
delivered in the marketplace are meant to reveal precisely how strong is the influence exerted 
by Christian morality and the steps one is required to take in detaching from, critiquing and 
 
12 Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 




undoing the effects not yet realised of the ‘death of God’. In order to be able to address the 
danger of nihilism, then, one must first see where it is rooted and what sustains it. Thus, as 
David Owen remarked, ‘prior to any such re-orientation, there must be the recognition of the 
need for re-orientation, and it is the failure of such recognition that is symbolised by the third 
appearance of the lantern of enlightenment: the madman’s smashing of the lantern on the 
floor’.13 So what this signifies is a change in the attitude of the Madman, when he realises that 
his listeners are not prepared to face up to the consequences of the ‘death of God’, and this 
failure of enlightenment results in his renunciation to engage directly with the people from the 
marketplace; the madman instead decides to chant a requiem in the churches, saying that those 
represent only the sepulchres of God.  
 
IV. Re-evaluation 
The rhetorical style used by Nietzsche, as I said in the introduction, also has a positive role, 
that of allowing us to construct something different, something new, an interpretation of life 
and a philosophy ‘beyond good and evil’, that comes as a replacement of the Christian 
worldview. Nietzsche wants to instil in us the desire to transcend the ‘slavish’ morality 
fundamental to Christianity, because, in doing so, we will come to affirm life once again. What 
I find relevant here is to comment briefly on the fourteenth section of the First Essay in the 
Genealogy of Morality, where he invites (or maybe, provokes) the reader to venture into the 
‘dark workshop of ideals’, to see what the real origin of our highest ideals is. The words and 
images used to describe this place, as well as the alert rhythm in which the unveiling of these 
hidden origins is presented, is meant to illustrate how deep-rooted is the morality that 
undermines and seeks to inhibit all manifestations of the will to power, and that the only way 
in which this morality can find expression is not in action, but feeling ‘the impotent failure to 
 




retaliate is to be transformed into “goodness”; craven fear into “humility”; submission to those 
one hates into “obedience”’ (Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, p. 31). It is by allowing us to 
see the contrast between nobles and slaves, between ressentiment and action, positive valuing, 
that we, the readers, are subtly guided towards the masters and their way of life. And 
Nietzsche’s use of metaphor and hyperbole is once again intended to make us see the worsening 
of man’s condition under a slavish morality and the need to overcome nihilism. 
Therefore, in all of Nietzsche’s texts, there is a deep connection between style and 
content, one that finds its justification in the way he understands the affective attachment that 
exists between those who have not yet renounced Christian morality and the values and ideals 
they believe in unconditionally. It can be rightfully said that Nietzsche recognises the threat 
posed by nihilism and the necessity to overcome the morality of ‘good and evil’ and as a 
remedy he makes ingenious use of rhetorical devices meant to open our existence to this danger, 
confront it and in the end still be able to affirm life through a new re-evaluation, one that goes 
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